

Byzantine Convex Consensus: An Optimal Algorithm*

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Abstract

Much of the past work on asynchronous approximate Byzantine consensus has assumed *scalar* inputs at the nodes [4, 8]. Recent work has yielded approximate Byzantine consensus algorithms for the case when the input at each node is a d -dimensional vector, and the nodes must reach consensus on a vector in the convex hull of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes [9, 13]. The d -dimensional vectors can be equivalently viewed as *points* in the d -dimensional Euclidean space. Thus, the algorithms in [9, 13] require the fault-free nodes to decide on a point in the d -dimensional space.

In our recent work [12], we proposed a generalization of the consensus problem, namely *Byzantine convex consensus* (BCC), which allows the decision to be a *convex polytope* in the d -dimensional space, such that the decided polytope is within the convex hull of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes. We also presented an asynchronous approximate BCC algorithm.

In this paper, we propose a new BCC algorithm with optimal fault-tolerance that also agrees on a convex polytope that is as *large* as possible under adversarial conditions. Our prior work [12] does not guarantee the optimality of the output polytope.

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1 Introduction

Much of the past work on asynchronous approximate Byzantine consensus has assumed *scalar* inputs at the nodes [4, 8]. Recent work has yielded approximate Byzantine consensus algorithms for the case when the input at each node is a d -dimensional vector, and the nodes must reach consensus on a vector in the convex hull of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes [9, 13]. The d -dimensional vectors can be equivalently viewed as *points* in the d -dimensional Euclidean space. Thus, the algorithms in [9, 13] require the fault-free nodes to decide on a point in the d -dimensional space. In our recent work [12], we considered a generalized problem, namely *Byzantine convex consensus* (BCC), which allows the decision to be a *convex polytope* in the d -dimensional space, such that the decided polytope is within the convex hull of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes. In this paper, we propose an asynchronous BCC algorithm with optimal fault-tolerance that reaches consensus on the convex polytope with an *optimal* output polytope (as defined later). This is an improvement over our previous algorithm in [12] that does not guarantee optimality of the output polytope.

The system under consideration is an *asynchronous* system consisting of n nodes, of which at most f may be Byzantine faulty. The Byzantine faulty nodes may behave in an arbitrary fashion, and may collude with each other. Each node i has a d -dimensional vector of reals as its *input* x_i . All nodes can communicate with each other directly on reliable and FIFO (first-in first-out) channels. Thus, the underlying communication graph can be modeled as a *complete graph*, with the set of nodes being $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$. The impossibility of *exact* consensus in asynchronous systems [5] applies to BCC as well. Therefore, we consider the *Approximate BCC* problem with the following requirements:

- **Validity:** The *output* (or *decision*) at each fault-free node must be a convex polytope in the convex hull of the d -dimensional input vectors at the fault-free nodes. (In a degenerate case, the output polytope may simply be a single *point*.)
- **ϵ -Agreement:** For any $\epsilon > 0$, the *Hausdorff distance* (defined below) between the output polytopes at any two fault-free nodes must be at most ϵ .
- **Termination:** Each fault-free node must terminate within a finite amount of time.

The motivation behind reaching consensus on a convex polytope is that a solution to BCC is expected to also facilitate solutions to a large range of consensus problems (e.g., Byzantine vector consensus [9, 13], or convex function optimization over a convex hull of the inputs at fault-free nodes). Future work will explore these potential applications.

Definition 1 For two convex polytopes h_1, h_2 , the Hausdorff distance is defined as [7]

$$d_H(h_1, h_2) = \max \left\{ \max_{p_1 \in h_1} \min_{p_2 \in h_2} d(p_1, p_2), \max_{p_2 \in h_2} \min_{p_1 \in h_1} d(p_1, p_2) \right\}$$

where $d(p, q)$ is the Euclidean distance between points p and q .

Optimality of the Output Polytope: The BCC algorithm proposed in this paper allows the nodes to agree on an output polytope that is “optimal” in the sense defined below.

Definition 2 Let A be an algorithm that solves Byzantine convex consensus (BCC). Algorithm A is said to reach consensus on an optimal convex polytope if for any BCC algorithm B , there

exist a behavior of the faulty nodes and a message delay pattern such that, at each fault-free node, the output polytope obtained using algorithm B is contained in the output polytope obtained using algorithm A .

We show that the BCC algorithm proposed here allows the nodes to agree on a polytope that is guaranteed to contain a polytope that is named I_Z in later analysis. I_Z is a function of the inputs at some of the fault-free nodes. We show that, for any correct BCC algorithm, there exists an execution in which the fault-free nodes must agree on a polytope that is equal to or contained in I_Z . Thus, as per Definition 2, the output polytope chosen by our algorithm is optimal.

Lower Bound on n : As noted above, [9, 13] consider the problem of reaching approximate Byzantine consensus on a vector (or a point) in the convex hull of the d -dimensional input vectors at the fault-free nodes, and show that $n \geq (d+2)f+1$ is necessary. [10] generalizes the same lower bound to colorless tasks. The lower bound proof in [9, 13] also implies that $n \geq (d+2)f+1$ is necessary to ensure that BCC is solvable. We do not reproduce the lower bound proof here, but in the rest of the paper, we assume that $n \geq (d+2)f+1$, and also that $n \geq 2$ (because consensus is trivial when $n = 1$).

2 Preliminaries

Some notations introduced throughout the paper are summarized in Appendix A. In this section, we introduce operations \mathcal{H} , H_l , H , and two communication primitives, *reliable broadcast* and *stable vector*, used later in the paper.

Definition 3 Given a set of points X , $\mathcal{H}(X)$ is defined as the convex hull of the points in X .

Definition 4 Suppose that ν convex polytopes h_1, h_2, \dots, h_ν , and ν constants c_1, c_2, \dots, c_ν are given such that (i) $0 \leq c_i \leq 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^\nu c_i = 1$, and (ii) for $1 \leq i \leq \nu$, if $c_i \neq 0$, then $h_i \neq \emptyset$. Linear combination of these convex polytopes, $H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_\nu; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\nu)$, is defined as follows:

- Let $Q := \{i \mid c_i \neq 0, 1 \leq i \leq \nu\}$.
- $p \in H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_\nu; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\nu)$ if and only if

$$\text{for each } i \in Q, \text{ there exists } p_i \in h_i, \text{ such that } p = \sum_{i \in Q} c_i p_i \quad (1)$$

Note that a convex polytope may possibly consist of a single point. Because h_i 's above are all convex, $H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_\nu; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\nu)$ is also a convex polytope (proof included in Appendix B for completeness). The parameters for H_l consist of two lists, a list of polytopes h_1, \dots, h_ν , and a list of weights c_1, \dots, c_ν . With a slight abuse of notation, we will specify one or both of these lists as either a *row vector* or a *multiset*, with the understanding that the *row vector* or *multiset* here represent an ordered list of its elements.

Function H below is called in our algorithm with parameters (\mathcal{V}, t) wherein t is a round index ($t \geq 0$) and \mathcal{V} is a set of tuples of the form $(h, j, t-1)$, where j is a node identifier; when $t = 0$, h is a set of received messages in the previous round, and when $t > 0$, h is a convex polytope.

Function $H(\mathcal{V}, t)$, $t \geq 0$:

If $t = 0$:

- For each tuple (x, k) , where x is a point and k is a node identifier, define $N(x, k) := |\{l \mid (\mathcal{I}, l, -1) \in \mathcal{V} \text{ and } (x, k, -1) \in \mathcal{I}\}|$.
- Define set $Y := \{(x, k) \mid N(x, k) \geq f + 1\}$.
- Define multiset $X := \{x \mid (x, k) \in Y\}$. Size of multiset X is identical to the size of set Y . In a multiset, same element may appear multiple times.
- $\text{temp} := \bigcap_{C \subseteq X, |C|=|X|-f} \mathcal{H}(C)$.
The intersection above is over the convex hulls of the subsets of X of size $|X| - f$.
- Return temp .

If $t > 0$:

- Define multiset $X := \{h \mid (h, j, t - 1) \in \mathcal{V}\}$. In our use of function H , each $h \in X$ is always non-empty.
- $\text{temp} := H_l(X; \frac{1}{|X|}, \dots, \frac{1}{|X|})$. Note that all the weights here are equal to $\frac{1}{|X|}$.
- Return temp .

Communication Primitives: As seen later, our algorithm proceeds in asynchronous rounds. We label the *preliminary round* as round -1 , and the remaining rounds as rounds $0, 1, 2$, etc. For communication between the nodes, we use the *reliable broadcast* primitive [1] and *stable vector* primitive [2, 10], which are also used in other related work [9, 13, 10]. Note that we adopt the version of stable vector presented in [10]. In particular, in round -1 (preliminary round), we use *stable vector* and *reliable broadcast* both, as explained below. In rounds 0 and larger, we only use *reliable broadcast*.

Round $t, t \geq 0$: In round $t, t \geq 0$, each node performs reliable broadcast of one message using **RBSend**. Each message sent using **RBSend** consists of a 3-tuple of the form (v, i, t) : here, i denotes the sender node's identifier, t is round index, and v is message value (the value v itself is often a tuple). The operation **RBSend** (v, i, t) is used by node i to perform *reliable broadcast* of (v, i, t) in round t . Each such message may be eventually reliably received by a fault-free node. When message (v, j, t) is *reliably received* by some node i , the event **RBRecv** (v, j, t) is said to have occurred at node i (note that i may possibly be equal to j). The second element in a reliably received 3-tuple message, namely j above, is always identical to the identifier of the node that performed the corresponding reliable broadcast. An appropriate handler is executed on each such **RBRecv** event, as described in the algorithm.

Round -1 : In round -1 , each node i performs reliable broadcast of message $(x_i, i, -1)$ using **RBSend** $(x_i, i, -1)$, where x_i is the input vector at node i . The *stable vector* primitive **SVRecv** (-1) is then invoked via a blocking call. **SVRecv** (-1) eventually returns at each fault-free node with a set containing at least $(n - f)$ messages of the form $(\cdot, \cdot, -1)$. These sets have the desirable property that the sets returned to *all* the fault-free nodes contain at least $(n - f)$ messages in common. Messages sent by some of the nodes using **RBSend** in round -1 may not be included in the set returned to a fault-free node by **SVRecv** (-1) . Each such message may be later delivered to the fault-free node via a **RBRecv** event. Thus, for round -1 , at fault-free node i , the **RBRecv** events

may occur only for messages that are not returned by **SVRecv**. An appropriate handler is executed on each such **RBRecv** event, as described in the algorithm below.

With a slight abuse of terminology, when we say that node j reliably receives $(v, i, -1)$, we mean that either (i) $(v, i, -1)$ is included in the set returned by **SVRecv**(-1) to node j , or (ii) event **RBRecv**($v, i, -1$) occurs at node j after **SVRecv**(-1) had already returned.

Properties of Communication Primitives: Each fault-free node performs one reliable broadcast (**RBSend**) in each round of our algorithm. *Reliable broadcast* and *stable vector* achieve the properties listed below, as proved previously [1, 10]. In the properties below, round index $r \geq -1$.

- **Fault-Free Integrity:** If a fault-free node i *never* reliably broadcasts (v, i, r) , then no fault-free node ever reliably receives (v, i, r) .
- **Fault-Free Liveness:** If a fault-free node i performs reliable broadcast of (v, i, r) , then each fault-free node eventually reliably receives (v, i, r) .
- **Global Uniqueness:** If two fault-free nodes i, j reliably receive (v, k, r) and (w, k, r) , respectively, then $v = w$, even if node k is faulty.
- **Global Liveness:** For any two fault-free nodes i, j , if i reliably receives (v, k, r) , then j will eventually reliably receive (v, k, r) , even if node k is faulty.
- **Fault-free Containment:** For fault-free nodes i, j , let R_i, R_j be the set of messages returned to nodes i, j by stable vector primitive **SVRecv**(-1) in round -1, respectively. Then, $|R_i| \geq n - f$, $|R_j| \geq n - f$, and either $R_i \subseteq R_j$ or $R_j \subseteq R_i$.

The last above property ensures that, in round -1, all the fault-free nodes receive at least $(n - f)$ identical messages. In addition to the above property, the following property is also ensured:

- Any fault-free node i , for any t and j , reliably receives (either via **SVRecv** or **RBRecv**) at most one message of the form $(*, j, t)$.

This property is implemented easily by requiring each node to, after receiving the first message of the form $(*, j, t)$, to simply ignore any further messages of that form. In our algorithm, each fault-free node j reliably broadcasts exactly one message of the form $(*, j, t)$ in any round t . Thus, the above property is useful to avoid responding to multiple messages with the same round index from a faulty node.

3 Proposed Algorithm: Optimal Verified Averaging

The proposed algorithm (named *Optimal Verified Averaging*) proceeds in asynchronous rounds. The input at each node i is a d -dimensional vector of reals, denoted as x_i . The initial round is called a *preliminary round*, and also referred to as round -1. Subsequent rounds are named round 0, 1, 2, etc. In each round $t \geq 0$, each node i computes a state variable h_i , which represents a convex polytope in the d -dimensional Euclidean space. We will refer to the value of h_i at the *end* of the t -th round performed by node i as $h_i[t]$, $t \geq 0$. Thus, for $t \geq 1$, $h_i[t - 1]$ is the value of h_i at the *start* of the t -th round at node i .

Similar to the algorithm in our prior work [12], we use a technique named *verification* to ensure that if a faulty node deviates from the algorithm specification (except possibly choosing an invalid

input vector), then its incorrect messages will be ignored by the fault-free nodes. The *verification* mechanism is motivated by prior work by other researchers [3]. With *verification*, aside from choosing a bad input, a faulty node cannot cause any other damage to the execution.

Before we present the proposed algorithm, we introduce a convention for the brevity of presentation:

- When we say that $(*, i, t) \in \mathcal{V}$, we mean that *there exists z such that $(z, i, t) \in \mathcal{V}$* .
- When we say that $(*, i, t) \notin \mathcal{V}$, we mean that $\forall z, (z, i, t) \notin \mathcal{V}$.

The proposed *Optimal Verified Averaging* algorithm for node $i \in V$ is presented below. All references to line numbers in our discussion refer to numbers listed on the right side of the algorithm pseudo-code. Recall that in round $t \geq 0$, whenever a message is reliably received by any node, a handler is called to process that message. In round -1 , messages that are not delivered by $\text{SVRecv}(-1)$ may be later reliably received via a RBRecv event, invoking the corresponding handler. Multiple such handlers may execute *concurrently* at a given node. For correct behavior, line 7, and lines 11-16 in the algorithm are atomically executed in a *critical section*. Thus, even though multiple event handlers may execute simultaneously, execution of line 7 in one instance of the handler is not interleaved with execution of any other handler instance; similarly, execution of lines 11-16 in one instance of the handler is not interleaved with execution of any other handler instance.

- **Round -1 :** In round -1 , each node i uses RBSend to reliably broadcast $(x_i, i, -1)$ where x_i is its input (line 1). Each node then calls the primitive $\text{SVRecv}(-1)$, which eventually returns with a set of messages tagged with index -1 . These messages are stored in $\text{Verified}_i[-1]$ and $\text{Verified}_i^c[-1]$ both (lines 2 and 3). At this point, $\text{Verified}_i^c[-1] = \text{Verified}_i[-1]$. At line 4, node i also sets $h_i[-1]$ to be equal to a default value \emptyset (because $h_i[-1]$ does not affect future computations). Afterwards, each node can proceed to round 0 (line 5).

Note that reliable broadcast of a message by some node j may not be received by node i using SVRecv at line 2; however, the message may be later reliably received by node i via a RBRecv event (line 6). Line 7 specifies the behavior of the event handler for event $\text{RBRecv}(x, j, -1)$ at node i . Whenever a message of the form $(x, j, -1)$ is reliably received via event $\text{RBRecv}(x, j, -1)$ (line 6), the set $\text{Verified}_i[-1]$ is updated (line 7). Since line 7 is performed atomically, $\text{Verified}_i[-1]$ may continue to grow even after node i has proceeded to round 0; however, $\text{Verified}_i^c[-1]$ is not modified again. Note that a message received by node i via SVRecv (at line 2) or RBRecv (at line 6) may possibly have been reliably broadcast by node i itself.

- **Round $t \geq 0$:** In round $t \geq 0$, *Optimal Verified Averaging* adopts a similar structure to round -1 , with one key difference: stable vector (SVRecv) is not used in these rounds, and all messages are received via RBRecv events. In round $t \geq 0$, node i first reliably broadcasts message $((h_i[t-1], \text{Verified}_i^c[t-1]), i, t)$ (line 8). Lines 9-16 specify the event handler for event $\text{RBRecv}((h, \mathcal{V}), j, t)$ at node i . Whenever a message of the form $((h, \mathcal{V}), j, t)$ is reliably received from node j (line 9), node i first waits until its own set $\text{Verified}_i[t-1]$ becomes large enough to contain \mathcal{V} . Note that $\text{Verified}_i[t-1]$ is initially computed in the round $t-1$, but it may continue to grow even after node i proceeds to round t . If the condition $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \text{Verified}_i[t-1]$ never becomes true, then this message is not processed further.

Recall that lines 11-16 are performed atomically. The message $((h, \mathcal{V}), j, t)$ is considered to be *verified* if Procedure $\text{Verify}(h, \mathcal{V}, j, t)$ returns TRUE (line 11). As shown in the pseudo-code for Verify , the verification checks performed are different for $t = 0$, $t = 1$ and $t \geq 2$. If

a message is thus verified, then some elements in the message are added to $Verified_i[t]$ via Procedure **Add**(\cdot) (line 12). As shown in the pseudo-code for **Add**, the elements added are different for $t = 0$, and $t \geq 1$.

Procedure **Proceed**(t) at line 13 determines whether set $Verified_i[t]$ has grown to a point where it is appropriate to compute the new state $h_i[t]$ (line 15) and proceed to round $t + 1$ (line 16). The checks performed in **Proceed**(t) are different for $t = 0$ and $t \geq 1$, as shown in the pseudo-code for **Proceed**. The value of $Verified_i[t]$ used to compute $h_i[t]$ is stored in $Verified_i^c[t]$ (line 14).

New messages may still be added to $Verified_i[t]$ if events of the form **RBRecv**($(h, \mathcal{V}), j, t$) occur after node i has proceeded to round $t + 1$. Thus, $Verified_i[t]$ may continue to grow even after node i has proceeded to round 1; however, $Verified_i^c[t]$ is not modified again, and remains unchanged after it is set at line 14.

Optimal Verified Averaging Algorithm: Steps performed at node i shown below.

The algorithm terminates after t_{end} rounds, where t_{end} is a constant, defined in (19).

Initialization: All sets used below are initialized to \emptyset .

Preliminary Round (Round -1) at node i :

- **RBSend**($x_i, i, -1$) 1
- $Verified_i[-1] := \mathbf{SVRecv}(-1)$ 2
- $Verified_i^c[-1] := Verified_i[-1]$ 3
- $h_i[-1] := \emptyset$ 4
- Proceed to Round 0 5

Comment: Message sent by j using **RBSend** may not be received by i using **SVRecv** at line 2. Due to Fault-free Liveness property of the primitive, this message will later be received by i using **RBRecv** at line 6 below.

- **Event handler for event RBRecv**($x, j, -1$) **at node i :** 6
- Line 7 is performed atomically.
- $Verified_i[-1] := Verified_i[-1] \cup \{(x, j, -1)\}$ 7

Round $t \geq 0$ at node i :

- **RBSend**($(h_i[t - 1], Verified_i^c[t - 1]), i, 0$) 8
- **Event handler for event RBRecv**($(h, \mathcal{V}), j, t$) **at node i :** 9

– Wait until $\mathcal{V} \subseteq \text{Verified}_i[t - 1]$	10
<u>Lines 11-16 are performed atomically.</u>	
– If $\text{Verify}(h, \mathcal{V}, j, t)$ returns TRUE then	11
$\text{Verified}_i[t] := \text{Add}(\text{Verified}_i[t], h, \mathcal{V}, j, t)$	12
– When $\text{Proceed}(t)$ returns TRUE for the first time	13
$\text{Verified}_i^c[t] := \text{Verified}_i[t]$	14
$h_i[t] := H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$	15
Proceed to Round $t + 1$	16

Procedure $\text{Verify}(h, \mathcal{V}, j, t)$ at node i :

- Case $t = 0$: If $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$, then return TRUE, else return FALSE.
 - Case $t = 1$: If $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$ and $h = H(\mathcal{V}, 0)$, then return TRUE, else return FALSE.
 - Case $t \geq 2$: If $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$ and $h = H(\mathcal{V}, t - 1)$ and $(*, j, t - 2) \in \mathcal{V}$, then return TRUE, else return FALSE.
-

Procedure $\text{Add}(\text{Verified}_i[t], h, \mathcal{V}, j, t)$ at node i :

- Case $t = 0$: return $\text{Verified}_i[t] \cup \{(\mathcal{V}, j, -1)\}$.
 - Case $t \geq 1$: return $\text{Verified}_i[t] \cup \{(h, j, t - 1)\}$.
-

Procedure $\text{Proceed}(t)$ at node i :

- Case $t = 0$: if $|\text{Verified}_i[0]| \geq n - f$, then return TRUE, else return FALSE.
 - Case $t \geq 1$: if $|\text{Verified}_i[t]| \geq n - f$ and $(h_i[t - 1], i, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i[t]$, then return TRUE, else return FALSE.
-

The algorithm terminates after t_{end} rounds, where t_{end} is a constant, defined in (19). The state $v_i[t_{end}]$ of each node i is its output when the algorithm terminates after t_{end} iterations.

Definition 5 *A node k 's execution of round r , $r \geq 0$, is said to be **verified by a fault-free node i** if, eventually node i reliably receives message of the form $((h, \mathcal{V}), k, r + 1)$ from node k , and subsequently adds (h, k, r) to $\text{Verified}_i[r + 1]$ (at line 12). Note that node k may possibly be faulty. Node k 's execution of round r is said to be **verified** if it is verified by at least one fault-free node.*

We now introduce some more notations (which are also summarized in Appendix A):

- For a given execution of the proposed algorithm, let F denote the *actual* set of faulty nodes in the execution. Let $|F| = \phi$. Thus, $0 \leq \phi \leq f$.

- For $r \geq 0$, let $F_v[r]$ denote the set of faulty nodes whose round r execution is verified by at least one fault-free node, as per Definition 5. Note that $F_v[r] \subseteq F$.
- Define $\overline{F}_v[r] = F - F_v[r]$, for $r \geq 0$.

For each faulty node $k \in F_v[r]$, by Definition 5, there must exist a fault-free node i that eventually reliably receives a message of the form $((h, \mathcal{V}), k, r+1)$ from node k , and adds (h, k, r) to $Verified_i[r+1]$. Given these h and \mathcal{V} , for future reference, let us define

$$h_k[r] = h \tag{2}$$

$$Verified_k^c[r] = \mathcal{V} \tag{3}$$

Node i verifies node k 's round r execution after node i has entered its round $r+1$. Since round r execution of faulty node k above is verified by fault-free node i , due to the checks performed in procedure **Verify**, the equality below holds for $h_k[r]$ and $Verified_k^c[r]$ defined in (2) and (3).

$$h_k[r] = H(Verified_k^c[r], r) \quad \text{for } r \geq 0 \tag{4}$$

(The proof of Claim 5 in Appendix E elaborates on the above equality.) While the algorithm requires each node k to maintain variables $h_k[r]$ and $Verified_k^c[r]$, we cannot assume correct behavior on the part of the faulty nodes. However, from the perspective of each fault-free node that verifies the round r execution of faulty node $k \in F_v[r]$, node k behaves “as if” these local variable take the values specified in (2) and (3) that satisfy (4). Note that if the round r execution (where $r \geq 0$) of a faulty node k is verified by more than one fault-free node, due to the *Global Uniqueness* of reliable broadcast, all these fault-free nodes must have reliably received identical round $r+1$ messages from node k .

Proofs of Lemmas 1, 2 and 3 below are presented in Appendices D, F, and H, respectively. These lemmas are used to prove the correctness of the *Optimal Verified Averaging* algorithm.

Lemma 1 *Optimal Verified Averaging ensures progress: (i) all the fault-free nodes will eventually progress to round 0; and, (ii) if all the fault-free nodes progress to the start of round t , $t \geq 0$, then all the fault-free nodes will eventually progress to the start of round $t+1$.*

Lemma 2 *For each node $i \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]$, the polytope $h_i[0]$ is non-empty.*

Lemma 3 *For $r \geq 0$, if $b \in \overline{F}_v[r]$, then for all $\tau \geq r$,*

- $b \in \overline{F}_v[\tau]$, and
- for all $i \in V - \overline{F}_v[\tau+1]$, $(*, b, \tau) \notin Verified_i^c[\tau+1]$.

4 Correctness

We first introduce some terminology and definitions related to matrices. Then, we develop a *transition matrix* representation of the proposed algorithm, and use that to prove its correctness. Note that the technique is identical to the one present in our prior work [12]. We include the proof here for completeness.

4.1 Matrix Preliminaries

We use boldface upper case letters to denote matrices, rows of matrices, and their elements. For instance, \mathbf{A} denotes a matrix, \mathbf{A}_i denotes the i -th row of matrix \mathbf{A} , and \mathbf{A}_{ij} denotes the element at the intersection of the i -th row and the j -th column of matrix \mathbf{A} .

Definition 6 *A vector is said to be stochastic if all its elements are non-negative, and the elements add up to 1. A matrix is said to be row stochastic if each row of the matrix is a stochastic vector.*

For matrix products, we adopt the “backward” product convention below, where $a \leq b$,

$$\Pi_{\tau=a}^b \mathbf{A}[\tau] = \mathbf{A}[b] \mathbf{A}[b-1] \cdots \mathbf{A}[a] \quad (5)$$

For a row stochastic matrix \mathbf{A} , coefficients of ergodicity $\delta(\mathbf{A})$ and $\lambda(\mathbf{A})$ are defined as follows [14]:

$$\begin{aligned} \delta(\mathbf{A}) &= \max_j \max_{i_1, i_2} \|\mathbf{A}_{i_1 j} - \mathbf{A}_{i_2 j}\| \\ \lambda(\mathbf{A}) &= 1 - \min_{i_1, i_2} \sum_j \min(\mathbf{A}_{i_1 j}, \mathbf{A}_{i_2 j}) \end{aligned}$$

Claim 1 *For any p square row stochastic matrices $\mathbf{A}(1), \mathbf{A}(2), \dots, \mathbf{A}(p)$,*

$$\delta(\Pi_{\tau=1}^p \mathbf{A}(\tau)) \leq \Pi_{\tau=1}^p \lambda(\mathbf{A}(\tau)).$$

Claim 1 is proved in [6]. Claim 2 below follows directly from the definition of $\lambda(\cdot)$.

Claim 2 *If there exists a constant γ , where $0 < \gamma \leq 1$, such that, for any pair of rows i, j of matrix \mathbf{A} , there exists a column g (that may depend on i, j) such that, $\min(\mathbf{A}_{ig}, \mathbf{A}_{jg}) \geq \gamma$, then $\lambda(\mathbf{A}) \leq 1 - \gamma < 1$.*

Let \mathbf{v} be a column vector with n elements, such that the i -th element of vector \mathbf{v} , namely \mathbf{v}_i , is a convex polytope in the d -dimensional Euclidean space. Let \mathbf{A} be a $n \times n$ row stochastic square matrix. Then multiplication of matrix \mathbf{A} and vector \mathbf{v} is performed by multiplying each row of \mathbf{A} with column vector \mathbf{v} of polytopes. Formally,

$$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{v} = [H_1(\mathbf{v}^T; \mathbf{A}_1) \quad H_1(\mathbf{v}^T; \mathbf{A}_2) \quad \dots \quad H_1(\mathbf{v}^T; \mathbf{A}_n)]^T \quad (6)$$

where T denotes the transpose operation (thus, \mathbf{v}^T is the transpose of \mathbf{v}). H_l is defined in Definition 4. Thus, the result of the multiplication $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{v}$ is a column vector consisting of n convex polytopes. Similarly, product of row vector \mathbf{A}_i and above vector \mathbf{v} is obtained as follows, and it is a polytope.

$$\mathbf{A}_i \mathbf{v} = H_l(\mathbf{v}^T; \mathbf{A}_i) \quad (7)$$

4.2 Transition Matrix Representation of *Optimal Verified Averaging*

Let $\mathbf{v}[t]$, $t \geq 0$, denote a column vector of length $|V| = n$. In the remaining discussion, we will refer to $\mathbf{v}[t]$ as the state of the system at the end of round t . In particular, $\mathbf{v}_i[t]$ for $i \in V$ is viewed as the state of node i at the end of round t . We define $\mathbf{v}[0]$ as follows:

(I1) For each fault-free node $i \in V - F$, $\mathbf{v}_i[0] := h_i[0]$.

(I2) For each faulty node $k \in F_v[0]$, $\mathbf{v}_k[0] := h_k[0]$, where $h_k[0]$ is defined in (2).

(I3) For each faulty node $k \in \overline{F_v}[0]$, $\mathbf{v}_k[0]$ is *arbitrarily* defined as the origin in the d -dimensional Euclidean space. We will justify this arbitrary choice later.

We will show that the state evolution can be represented in a matrix form as in (8) below, for a suitably chosen $n \times n$ matrix $\mathbf{M}[t]$. $\mathbf{M}[t]$ is said to be the *transition matrix* for round t .

$$\mathbf{v}[t] = \mathbf{M}[t] \mathbf{v}[t-1], \quad t \geq 1 \quad (8)$$

For all $t \geq 0$, Theorem 1 below proves that, for each $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$, $h_i[t] = \mathbf{v}_i[t]$.

Given a particular execution of the algorithm, we construct the transition matrix $\mathbf{M}[t]$ for round $t \geq 1$ using the following procedure.

Construction of the Transition Matrix for Round t ($t \geq 1$)

- For each node $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$, and each $k \in V$:

If $(*, k, t-1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t]$, then

$$\mathbf{M}_{ik}[t] := \frac{1}{|\text{Verified}_i^c[t]|} \quad (9)$$

Otherwise,

$$\mathbf{M}_{ik}[t] := 0 \quad (10)$$

Comment: For a faulty node $i \in F_v[t]$, $h_i[t]$ and $\text{Verified}_i^c[t]$ are defined in (2) and (3).

- For each node $j \in \overline{F_v}[t]$, and each $k \in V$,

$$\mathbf{M}_{jk}[t] := \frac{1}{n} \quad (11)$$

Theorem 1 For $r \geq 0$, with state evolution specified as $\mathbf{v}[r+1] = \mathbf{M}[r+1]\mathbf{v}[r]$ using $\mathbf{M}[r+1]$ constructed above, for all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[r]$, (i) $h_i[r]$ is non-empty, and (ii) $h_i[r] = \mathbf{v}_i[r]$.

Proof:

The proof of the theorem is by induction. The theorem holds for $r = 0$ due to Lemma 2, and the choice of the elements of $\mathbf{v}[0]$, as specified in (I1), (I2) and (I3) above.

Now, suppose that the theorem holds for $r = t-1$ where $t-1 \geq 0$, and prove it for $r = t$. Thus, by induction hypothesis, for all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[t-1]$, $h_i[t-1] = \mathbf{v}_i[t-1] \neq \emptyset$. Now, $\mathbf{v}[t] = \mathbf{M}[t]\mathbf{v}[t-1]$.

- In round $t \geq 1$, each fault-free node $i \in V - F$ computes its new state $h_i[t]$ at line 15 using function $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$. The function $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$ for $t \geq 1$ then computes a linear combination of $|\text{Verified}_i^c[t]|$ convex hulls, with all the weights being equal to $\frac{1}{|\text{Verified}_i^c[t]|}$. Also, by Definition 5 and the definition of $\overline{F_v}[t-1]$, if $(h, j, t-1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t]$, then $j \notin \overline{F_v}[t-1]$ (i.e., $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t-1]$). Therefore, if $(h, j, t-1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t]$, then either j is fault-free, or

it is faulty and its round $t - 1$ execution is verified: thus, $h = h_j[t - 1]$. Also, by induction hypothesis, $h = h_j[t - 1] \neq \emptyset$. This implies that $h_i[t] = H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$ is non-empty.

Then observe that, by defining $\mathbf{M}_{ik}[t]$ elements as in (9) and (10), we ensure that $\mathbf{M}_i[t]\mathbf{v}[t - 1]$ equals $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$, and hence equals $h_i[t]$.

- For $i \in F_v[t]$ as well, as shown in (4), $h_i[t] = H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$, where $h_i[t]$ and $\text{Verified}_i^c[t]$ are as defined in (2) and (3). The function $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$ for $t \geq 1$ then computes a linear combination of $|\text{Verified}_i^c[t]|$ convex hulls, with all the weights being equal to $\frac{1}{|\text{Verified}_i^c[t]|}$. Consider an element $(h, j, t - 1)$ in $\text{Verified}_i^c[t]$. We argue that $j \in V - \overline{F}_v[t - 1]$. Suppose this is not true, i.e., $j \in \overline{F}_v[t - 1]$. By Definition 5, node i 's round t execution is verified by some fault-free node k , which implies that eventually, $\text{Verified}_i^c[t] \subseteq \text{Verified}_k[t]$. However, since k is fault-free, and $(h, j, t - 1) \notin \text{Verified}_k[t]$, a contradiction. Hence, if $(h, j, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t]$, then $j \in V - \overline{F}_v[t - 1]$. That is, if $(h, j, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t]$, then either j is fault-free, or it is faulty and its round $t - 1$ execution is verified: thus, $h = h_j[t - 1]$.

Also, by induction hypothesis, $h = h_j[t - 1] \neq \emptyset$. This implies that $h_i[t] = H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$ is non-empty.

Then observe that, by defining $\mathbf{M}_{ik}[t]$ elements as in (9) and (10), we ensure that $\mathbf{M}_i[t]\mathbf{v}[t - 1]$ equals $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[t], t)$, and hence equals $h_i[t]$.

□

Now, we argue that for $t \geq 0$, the state $\mathbf{v}_j[t]$ for each node $j \in \overline{F}_v[t]$ does not affect the state of the nodes $V - \overline{F}_v[\tau]$, for $\tau \geq t + 1$. From the discussion in the above proof, we see that for $j \in \overline{F}_v[t]$, $(*, j, t) \notin \text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1]$ for $i \in V - \overline{F}_v[t + 1]$. Thus, the state $\mathbf{v}_j[t]$ does not affect the state $h_i[t + 1]$. Then, by Lemma 3, if $j \in \overline{F}_v[t]$, then $j \in \overline{F}_v[\tau]$, for $\tau \geq t + 1$. Thus, by the same argument, the state $\mathbf{v}_j[\tau]$ does not affect the state $h_i[t + 1]$. This justifies the somewhat arbitrary choice of $\mathbf{v}_j[0]$ for $j \in \overline{F}_v[0]$, and $\mathbf{M}_{jk}[t]$ in (11) for $j \in \overline{F}_v[t]$, $t \geq 1$. This choice does simplify the remaining proof somewhat.

The above discussion shows that, for $t \geq 1$, the evolution of $\mathbf{v}[t]$ can be written as in (8), that is, $\mathbf{v}[t] = \mathbf{M}[t]\mathbf{v}[t - 1]$. Given the matrix product definition in (6), it is easy to verify that

$$\mathbf{M}[\tau + 1] (\mathbf{M}[\tau]\mathbf{v}[\tau - 1]) = (\mathbf{M}[\tau + 1]\mathbf{M}[\tau]) \mathbf{v}[\tau - 1] \text{ for } \tau \geq 1.$$

Therefore, by repeated application of (8), we obtain:

$$\mathbf{v}[t] = (\prod_{\tau=1}^t \mathbf{M}[\tau]) \mathbf{v}[0], \quad t \geq 1 \tag{12}$$

Recall that we adopt the “backward” matrix product convention presented in (5).

Lemma 4 *For $t \geq 1$, transition matrix $\mathbf{M}[t]$ constructed using the above procedure satisfies the following conditions.*

- For $i, j \in V$, there exists a fault-free node $g(i, j)$ such that $\mathbf{M}_{ig(i,j)}[t] \geq \frac{1}{n}$.
- $\mathbf{M}[t]$ is a row stochastic matrix, and $\lambda(\mathbf{M}[t]) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n}$.

The proof of Lemma 4 is presented in Appendix J.

4.3 Correctness of *Optimal Verified Averaging*

Definition 7 A convex polytope h is said to be valid if every point in h is in the convex hull of the inputs at the fault-free nodes.

Lemmas 5 and 6 below are proved in Appendices K and L, respectively.

Lemma 5 $h_i[0]$ for each node $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$ is valid.

Lemma 6 Suppose non-empty convex polytopes h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k are all valid. Consider k constants c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k such that $0 \leq c_i \leq 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^k c_i = 1$. Then the linear combination of these convex polytopes, $H_i(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k)$, is valid.

Theorem 2 *Optimal Verified Averaging* satisfies the validity, ϵ -agreement and termination properties after a large enough number of asynchronous rounds.

Proof: Repeated applications of Lemma 1 ensures that the fault-free nodes will progress from the preliminary round through round r , for any $r \geq 0$, allowing us to use (12). Consider round $t \geq 1$. Let

$$\mathbf{M}^* = \Pi_{\tau=1}^t \mathbf{M}[\tau] \quad (13)$$

(To simplify the presentation, we do not include the round index $[t]$ in the notation \mathbf{M}^* above.) Then $\mathbf{v}[t] = \mathbf{M}^* \mathbf{v}[0]$. By Lemma 4, each $\mathbf{M}[t]$ is a *row stochastic* matrix, therefore, \mathbf{M}^* is also row stochastic. By Lemma 5, $h_i[0] = \mathbf{v}_i[0]$ for each $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$ is valid. Therefore, by Lemma 6, $\mathbf{M}_i^* \mathbf{v}[0]$ for each $i \in V - F$ is valid. Also, by Theorem 1 and (12), $h_i[t] = \mathbf{M}_i^* \mathbf{v}[0]$ for $i \in V - F$. Thus, $h_i[t]$ is valid for $t \geq 1$. This observation together with Lemma 5 implies that *Optimal Verified Averaging* satisfies the validity condition for all round $r \geq 0$.

Let us define $\alpha = 1 - \frac{1}{n}$. By Lemma 4, $\lambda(\mathbf{M}[t]) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n} = \alpha$. Then by Claim 1,

$$\delta(\mathbf{M}^*) = \delta(\Pi_{\tau=1}^t \mathbf{M}[\tau]) \leq \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \Pi_{\tau=1}^t \lambda(\mathbf{M}[\tau]) \leq \left(1 - \frac{1}{n}\right)^t = \alpha^t \quad (14)$$

Consider any two fault-free nodes $i, j \in V - F$. By (14), $\delta(\mathbf{M}^*) \leq \alpha^t$. Therefore, by the definition of $\delta(\cdot)$, for $1 \leq k \leq n$,

$$\|\mathbf{M}_{ik}^* - \mathbf{M}_{jk}^*\| \leq \alpha^t \quad (15)$$

By Lemma 3, and construction of the transition matrices, it should be easy to see that $\mathbf{M}_{ib}^* = 0$ for $b \in \overline{F_v}[0]$. Then, for any point p_i^* in $h_i[t] = \mathbf{M}_i^* \mathbf{v}[0]$, there must exist, for all $k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$, $p_k \in h_k[0]$, such that

$$p_i^* = \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{ik}^* p_k = \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{ik}^* p_k(1), \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{ik}^* p_k(2), \dots, \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{ik}^* p_k(d) \right) \quad (16)$$

where $p_k(l)$ denotes the value of p_k 's l -th coordinate. Now choose point p_j^* in $h_j[t]$ defined as follows.

$$p_j^* = \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{jk}^* p_k = \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{jk}^* p_k(1), \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{jk}^* p_k(2), \dots, \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{jk}^* p_k(d) \right) \quad (17)$$

Then the Euclidean distance between p_i^* and p_j^* is $d(p_i^*, p_j^*)$. The following derivation is obtained by simple algebraic manipulation, using (15), (16) and (17). The omitted steps in the algebraic manipulation are shown in Appendix M.

$$\begin{aligned} d(p_i^*, p_j^*) &= \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d (p_i^*(l) - p_j^*(l))^2} = \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]} \mathbf{M}_{ik}^* p_k(l) - \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]} \mathbf{M}_{jk}^* p_k(l) \right)^2} \\ &\leq \alpha^t \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]} \|p_k(l)\| \right)^2} \leq \alpha^t \Omega \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

where $\Omega = \max_{p_k \in h_k[0], k \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]} \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]} \|p_k(l)\| \right)^2}$. Because the $h_k[0]$'s in the definition of Ω are all valid (by Lemma 5), Ω can itself be upper bounded by a function of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes. In particular, under the assumption that each element of fault-free nodes' input vectors is upper bounded by U and lower bounded by μ , Ω is upper bounded by $\sqrt{dn^2 \max(U^2, \mu^2)}$. Observe that the upper bound on the right side of (18) monotonically decreases with t , because $\alpha < 1$. Define t_{end} as the smallest positive integer t for which

$$\alpha^t \sqrt{dn^2 \max(U^2, \mu^2)} < \epsilon \quad (19)$$

Recall that the algorithm terminates after t_{end} rounds. (18) and (19) together imply that, for fault-free i, j , for each point $p_i^* \in h_i[t_{end}]$ there exists a point $p_j^*[t] \in h_j[t_{end}]$ such that $d(p_i^*, p_j^*) < \epsilon$ (and, similarly, vice-versa). Thus, by Definition 1, Hausdorff distance $\mathbf{d}_H(h_i[t_{end}], h_j[t_{end}]) < \epsilon$. Since this holds true for any pair of fault-free nodes i, j , the ϵ -agreement property is satisfied at termination. \square

5 Optimality of *Optimal Verified Averaging*

Due to the *Fault-free Containment* property of *Stable Vector*, all fault-free nodes share at least $(n - f)$ messages in $Verified_i^c[-1]$ (see lines 2-3). Let Z denote the set of these shared messages, that is,

$$Z := \bigcap_{j \in V - F} Verified_j^c[-1] \quad (20)$$

Define $X_Z =: \{x \mid (x, k, -1) \in Z\}$. Then, define a convex polytope I_Z as follows.

$$I_Z := \bigcap_{D \subset X_Z, |D|=|X_Z|-f} \mathcal{H}(D) \quad (21)$$

The following lemma establishes a “lower bound” on the convex polytope that the fault-free nodes decide on. Recall that $\overline{F}_v[0]$ is defined as all the faulty nodes that are not verified by any fault-free nodes in Round 1. The proof is presented in Appendix N.

Lemma 7 *For all $i \in V - \overline{F}_v[t]$ and $t \geq 0$, $I_Z \subseteq h_i[t]$.*

Then, the following key theorem shows that the presented algorithm is optimal. The proof is presented in Appendix O. This theorem closes an open question raised in our prior work [12].

Theorem 3 *The output convex polytope at fault-free node i using Optimal Verified Averaging is optimal as per Definition 2.*

6 Summary

This paper considers Byzantine Convex Consensus (BCC), wherein each node has a d -dimensional vector as its input, and each fault-free node should agree on an output polytope that is in the convex hull of the input vectors at the fault-free nodes. We present an asynchronous approximate BCC algorithm with optimal fault tolerance that reaches consensus on an *optimal* output polytope.

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A Notations

This appendix summarizes some of the notations and terminology introduced throughout the paper.

- n = number of nodes. We assume that $n \geq 2$.
- f = maximum number of Byzantine nodes.
- $V = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ is the set of all nodes.
- d = dimension of the input vector at each node.
- $d(p, q)$ = the function returns the Euclidean distance between points p and q .
- $d_H(h_1, h_2)$ = the Hausdorff distance between convex polytopes h_1, h_2 .
- $\mathcal{H}(C)$ = the convex hull of a multiset C .
- $H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k)$, defined in Section 2, is a linear combination of convex polytopes h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k with weights c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k .
- $H(\mathcal{V}, t)$ is a function defined in Section 2.
- $|X|$ = the size of a *multiset* or *set* X .
- $\|a\|$ = the absolute value of a real number a .
- F denotes the *actual* set of faulty nodes in an execution of the algorithm.
- $\phi = |F|$. Thus, $0 \leq \phi \leq f$.
- $F_v[t]$, $t \geq 0$, denotes the set of faulty nodes whose round t execution is verified by at least one fault-free node, as per Definition 5.
- $\overline{F}_v[t] = F - F_v[t]$, $t \geq 0$.
- $\alpha = 1 - \frac{1}{n}$.
- We use boldface upper case letters to denote matrices, rows of matrices, and their elements. For instance, \mathbf{A} denotes a matrix, \mathbf{A}_i denotes the i -th row of matrix \mathbf{A} , and \mathbf{A}_{ij} denotes the element at the intersection of the i -th row and the j -th column of matrix \mathbf{A} .

B $H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_\nu; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\nu)$ is Convex

Claim 3 $H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_\nu; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\nu)$ defined in Definition 4 is convex.

Proof:

The proof is straightforward.

Let

$$h_L := H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_\nu; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_\nu)$$

and

$$Q := \{i \mid c_i \neq 0, 1 \leq i \leq \nu\}.$$

Given any two points x, y in h_L , by Definition 4, we have

$$x = \sum_{i \in Q} c_i p_{(i,x)} \quad \text{for some } p_{(i,x)} \in h_i, \quad i \in Q \quad (22)$$

and

$$y = \sum_{i \in Q} c_i p_{(i,y)} \quad \text{for some } p_{(i,y)} \in h_i, \quad i \in Q \quad (23)$$

Now, we show that any convex combination of x and y is also in h_L . Consider a point z such that

$$z = \theta x + (1 - \theta)y \quad \text{where } 0 \leq \theta \leq 1 \quad (24)$$

Substituting (22) and (23) into (24), we have

$$\begin{aligned} z &= \theta \sum_{i \in Q} c_i p_{(i,x)} + (1 - \theta) \sum_{i \in Q} c_i p_{(i,y)} \\ &= \sum_{i \in Q} c_i (\theta p_{(i,x)} + (1 - \theta) p_{(i,y)}) \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

Define $p_{(i,z)} = \theta p_{(i,x)} + (1 - \theta) p_{(i,y)}$ for all $i \in Q$. Since h_i is convex, and $p_{(i,z)}$ is a convex combination of $p_{(i,x)}$ and $p_{(i,y)}$, $p_{(i,z)}$ is also in h_i . Substituting the definition of $p_{(i,z)}$ in (25), we have

$$z = \sum_{i \in Q} c_i p_{(i,z)} \quad \text{where } p_{(i,z)} \in h_i, \quad i \in Q$$

Hence, by Definition 4, z is also in h_L . Therefore, h_L is convex. □

C Claim 4

Claim 4 Consider fault-free nodes $i, j \in V - F$. Then

- If $(h, k, -1) \in \text{Verified}_i[-1]$ at some point of time, then eventually, $(h, k, -1) \in \text{Verified}_j[-1]$.
- For $t \geq 0$, if $(h, k, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i[t]$ at some point of time, then eventually $(h, k, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_j[t]$.

Proof:

First Part:

In the preliminary round ($t = -1$), node i adds (h, k) to $\text{Verified}_i[-1]$ whenever it reliably receives message $(h, k, -1)$, i.e., $(h, k, -1)$ is either received by using stable vector or $\text{RBRecv}(h, k, -1)$

occurred. (For messages in the preliminary round, h is just a single point.) Then by *Global Liveness* property, node j will eventually reliably receive the same message, and add $(h, k, -1)$ to $Verified_j[-1]$.

Second Part:

The proof is by induction.

Induction basis: Suppose that in round $t = 0$, at some real time μ , $(h, k, -1) \in Verified_i[0]$. Thus, node i must have reliably received (at line 9 of round 0) a message of the form $((h, \mathcal{V}), k, -1)$ such that the following conditions are true at time μ :

- Condition 1: $\mathcal{V} \subseteq Verified_i[-1]$ (due to line 10, and the fact that $Verified_i[-1]$ can only grow with time)
- Condition 2: $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$ (due to Case $t = 0$ in Procedure **Verify**)

The *Global Liveness* property implies that eventually node j will also reliably receive the message $((h, \mathcal{V}), k, 0)$ that was reliably received by node i . Also, the correctness of the first part implies that eventually each element of $Verified_i[-1]$ will be included in $Verified_j[-1]$. Thus, because $\mathcal{V} \subseteq Verified_i[-1]$ at time μ , eventually $\mathcal{V} \subseteq Verified_j[-1]$. As in Condition 2 above, node j will also find that $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$. Therefore, by lines 10-12, it follows that eventually $(h, k, -1) \in Verified_j[0]$.

Induction: Consider round $t \geq 1$. Assume that the second part of the lemma holds true through rounds $t - 1$. Therefore, if $(h, k, t - 2) \in Verified_i[t - 1]$ at some point of time, then eventually $(h, k, t - 2) \in Verified_j[t - 1]$.

Now we will prove that the second part of the lemma holds for round t . Suppose that at some time μ , $(h, k, t - 1) \in Verified_i[t]$. Thus, node i must have reliably received (at line 9 of round t) a message of the form $((h, \mathcal{V}), k, t)$ such that the following conditions are true at time μ :

- Condition 1: $\mathcal{V} \subseteq Verified_i[t - 1]$ (due to 10, and the fact that $Verified_i[t - 1]$ can only grow with time)
- Condition 2.1: when $t = 1$, $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$ and $h = H(\mathcal{V}, 0)$ (due to Case $t = 1$ in Procedure **Verify**)
- Condition 2.2: when $t \geq 2$, $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$, $h = H(\mathcal{V}, t - 1)$, and $(*, k, t - 2) \in \mathcal{V}$ (due to Case $t \geq 2$ in Procedure **Verify**)

The correctness of the second part of the lemma through round $t - 1$ implies that eventually each element of $Verified_i[t - 1]$ will be included in $Verified_j[t - 1]$. Thus, because $\mathcal{V} \subseteq Verified_i[t - 1]$ at time μ , eventually $\mathcal{V} \subseteq Verified_j[t - 1]$. Also, the *Global Liveness* property implies that eventually node j will reliably receive the message $((h, \mathcal{V}), k, t)$ that was reliably received by node i ; then, consider two cases:

- When $t = 1$, as in Condition 2.1 above, node j will also find that $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$, and $h = H(\mathcal{V}, 0)$. Therefore, by lines 10-12, it follows that eventually $(h, k, t - 1) \in Verified_j[t]$.
- When $r \geq 2$, as in Condition 2.2 above, node j will also find that $|\mathcal{V}| \geq n - f$, $(*, k, t - 2) \in \mathcal{V}$ and $h = H(\mathcal{V}, t - 1)$. Therefore, by lines 10-12, it follows that eventually $(h, k, t - 1) \in Verified_j[t]$.

Therefore, the proof for the second part is complete. □

D Proof of Lemma 1

Lemma 1: *Optimal Verified Averaging ensures progress: (i) all the fault-free nodes will eventually progress to round 0; and, (ii) if all the fault-free nodes progress to the start of round t , $t \geq 0$, then all the fault-free nodes will eventually progress to the start of round $t + 1$.*

Proof: First Part:

By assumption, all fault-free nodes begin the preliminary round eventually, and perform reliable broadcast of their input (line 1). Since the $(n - f)$ fault-free nodes follow the algorithm correctly, `SVRecv(-1)` will eventually return (line 2). Therefore, node i will eventually proceed to round 0 (line 5).

Second Part:

The proof is by induction. By the first part, each fault-free node i begins round 0 eventually, and performs reliable broadcast of $((h_i[-1], \text{Verified}_i^c[-1]), i, 0)$ on line 8. Consider fault-free nodes i, j . By *Fault-Free Liveness* property of the primitives, node i will eventually reliably receive message $((h_j[-1], \text{Verified}_j^c[-1]), j, 0)$ from fault-free node j . By Claim 4, eventually, $\text{Verified}_j^c[-1] \subseteq \text{Verified}_i[-1]$; therefore, node i will progress past line 10. Moreover, since node j is fault-free, it follows the algorithm specification correctly. Therefore, `Verify` will return `TRUE`, and node i will eventually include $(\text{Verified}_j^c[-1], j, -1)$. Since the above argument holds for all fault-free nodes i, j , it implies that each fault-free node i eventually adds $(\text{Verified}_j^c[-1], j, -1)$ to $\text{Verified}_i[0]$, for each fault-free node j (including $j = i$). Therefore, at each fault-free node i , eventually, $|\text{Verified}_i[0]| \geq n - f$, thus satisfying the condition in Case $t = 0$ of Procedure `Proceed`. Thus, Procedure `Proceed` will return `TRUE`, and each fault-free node i will eventually proceed to round 1 (lines 13-16).

Now we assume that all the fault-free nodes have progressed to the start of round t , where $t \geq 1$, and prove that all the fault-free nodes will eventually progress to the start of round $t + 1$.

Consider fault-free nodes $i, j \in V - F$. At line 8 of round t , fault-free node j performs reliable broadcast of $((h_j[t - 1], \text{Verified}_j^c[t - 1]), j, t)$. By *Fault-free Liveness* of reliable broadcast, fault-free node i will eventually reliably receive message $((h_j[t - 1], \text{Verified}_j^c[t - 1]), j, t)$ from fault-free node j . By Claim 4, eventually $\text{Verified}_j^c[t - 1] \subseteq \text{Verified}_i[t - 1]$; therefore, node i will progress past line 10 in the handler for message $((h_j[t - 1], \text{Verified}_j^c[t - 1]), j, t)$. Moreover, since node j is fault-free, it follows the algorithm specification correctly. Therefore, Procedure `Verify` will return `TRUE` in the handler at node i for message $((h_j[t - 1], \text{Verified}_j^c[t - 1]), j, t)$ will all be correct. Therefore, by lines 11-12, node i will eventually include $(h_j[t - 1], j, t - 1)$ in $\text{Verified}_i[t]$. Since the above argument holds for all fault-free nodes i, j , it implies that each fault-free node i eventually adds $(h_j[t - 1], j, t - 1)$ to $\text{Verified}_i[t]$, for each fault-free node j (including $j = i$). Therefore, at each fault-free node i , eventually, $|\text{Verified}_i[t]| \geq n - f$, and $(h_i[t - 1], i, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i[t]$ (because the previous statement holds for $j = i$ too), thus satisfying both the conditions in Case $t \geq 1$ of Procedure `Proceed`. Thus, Procedure `Proceed` will return `TRUE`, and each fault-free node i will eventually proceed to round $t + 1$ (lines 13-16).

□

E Claims 5 and 6

Claim 5 *If faulty node i 's round t execution is verified by a fault-free node j , then the following statements hold:*

- (i) For $t \geq 0$, $Verified_i^c[t] \geq n - f$ and $h_i[t] = H(Verified_i^c[t], t)$,
- (ii) For $t \geq 0$, eventually $Verified_i^c[t] \subseteq Verified_j[t]$, and
- (iii) For $t \geq 1$, node i 's round $t - 1$ execution is also verified by node j .

Proof: Let $t \geq 0$. Suppose that node i 's round t execution is verified by a fault-free node j . In this case, we can use definitions (2) and (3) of $h_i[t]$ and $Verified_i^c[t]$. Definition 5 implies that node j eventually reliably receives message $((h_i[t], Verified_i^c[t]), i, t + 1)$ from node i , and subsequently adds (at line 12 in its round $t + 1$) $(h_i[t], i, t)$ to $Verified_j[t + 1]$. This implies that this message satisfies the checks done by node j at lines 10 and 11: Specifically, (a) $|Verified_i^c[t]| \geq n - f$, (b) $h_i[t] = H(Verified_i^c[t], t)$, and (c) for $t \geq 1$, $(*, i, t - 1) \in Verified_i^c[t]$. Also, by the time node j adds $(h_i[t], i, t)$ to $Verified_j[t + 1]$, the condition checked at line 10 also hold: specifically, $Verified_i^c[t] \subseteq Verified_j[t]$, proving claim (ii) stated above. Also, (a) and (b) above prove claim (i).

For $t \geq 1$, $(*, i, t - 1) \in Verified_i^c[t]$ and eventually $Verified_i^c[t] \subseteq Verified_j[t]$ together imply that eventually $(*, i, t - 1) \in Verified_j[t]$. Then this observation together with Definition 5 imply that round $t - 1$ execution of node i is verified by node j . This proves claim (iii). \square

Claim 6 *If faulty node i 's round t execution is verified by a fault-free node j , $t \geq 0$, then for all r such that $0 \leq r \leq t$, node i 's round r execution is verified by node j .*

Proof: The claim is trivially true for $t = 0$. The proof of the claim for $t > 0$ follows by repeated application of Claim 5(iii) above. \square

F Proof of Lemma 2

The proof of Lemma 2 uses the following theorem by Tverberg [11]:

Theorem 4 *(Tverberg's Theorem [11]) For any integer $f \geq 0$, for every multiset Y containing at least $(d + 1)f + 1$ points in a d -dimensional space, there exists a partition Y_1, \dots, Y_{f+1} of Y into $f + 1$ non-empty multisets such that $\bigcap_{i=1}^{f+1} \mathcal{H}(Y_i) \neq \emptyset$.*

Now we prove Lemma 2.

Lemma 2: *For each node $i \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]$, the polytope $h_i[0]$ is non-empty.*

Proof: Note that $V - \overline{F}_v[0] = (V - F) \cup F_v[0]$.

- For a fault-free node $i \in V - F$, since it behaves correctly, $|Verified_i^c[0]| \geq n - f$ (due to the checks performed in `Verify`), and $h_i[0] = H(Verified_i^c[0], 0)$ (due to line 15).
- For faulty node $i \in F_v[0]$ as well, by Claim 5(i) in Appendix E, $|Verified_i^c[0]| \geq n - f$ and $h_i[0] = H(Verified_i^c[0], 0)$.

Thus, for each $i \in V - \overline{F}_v[0]$, $|Verified_i^c[0]| \geq n - f$ and $h_i[0] = H(Verified_i^c[0], 0)$.

Consider any $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$. Consider the computation of polytope $h_i[0]$ as $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$. By step 3 of Case $t = 0$ in function H in Section 2, $|X| = |\text{Verified}_i^c[0]| \geq n - f$. Recall that, due to the lower bound on n discussed in Section 1, we assume $n \geq (d + 2)f + 1$. Thus, in function H , $|X| \geq n - f \geq (d + 1)f + 1$. By Theorem 4 above, there exists a partition X_1, X_2, \dots, X_{f+1} of X into multisets X_j such that $\cap_{j=1}^{f+1} \mathcal{H}(X_j) \neq \emptyset$. Let us define

$$J = \cap_{i=1}^{f+1} \mathcal{H}(X_j) \quad (26)$$

Thus, J is non-empty. In item (i.e., step) 4 of Case $t = 0$ in function H , because $|X| \geq n - f$, each multiset C used in the computation of function H is of size at least $n - 2f$. Thus, each C excludes only f elements of X , whereas there are $f + 1$ multisets in the above partition of X . Therefore, each set C in step 4 of item 1 of function H will fully contain at least one multiset X_j from the partition. Therefore, $\mathcal{H}(C)$ will contain J . Since this holds true for all C 's, J is contained in the convex polytope computed by $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$. Since J is non-empty, $h_i[0] = H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$ is non-empty. □

G Claim 7

Claim 7 For $t \geq 0$, if $b \in \overline{F_v}[t]$, then for all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[t + 1]$, $(*, b, t) \notin \text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1]$.

Proof: Consider faulty node $b \in \overline{F_v}[t]$. Note that $V - \overline{F_v}[t + 1] = (V - F) \cup F_v[t + 1]$.

- Consider a fault-free node $i \in V - F$. Since $b \in \overline{F_v}[t]$, node b 's round t execution is *not* verified by *any* fault-free node. Therefore, by Definition 5, for fault-free node $i \in V - F$, **at all times**, $(*, b, t) \notin \text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1]$. Therefore, by line 14, $(*, b, t) \notin \text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1]$.
- Consider a faulty node $i \in F_v[t + 1]$. In this case, the proof is by contradiction. In particular, for some h , assume that $(h, b, t) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1]$. Since $i \in F_v[t + 1]$, there exists a fault-free node j that verifies the round $t + 1$ execution of node i . Therefore, by Claim 5(ii) in Appendix E, eventually $\text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1] \subseteq \text{Verified}_j[t + 1]$. This observation, along with the above assumption that $(h, b, t) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1]$, implies that eventually $(h, b, t) \in \text{Verified}_j[t + 1]$. Since node j is fault-free, Definition 5 implies that execution of node b in round t is verified, and hence $b \in F_v[t]$. This is a contradiction. Therefore, $(*, b, t) \notin \text{Verified}_i^c[t + 1]$. □

H Proof of Lemma 3

Lemma 3: For $r \geq 0$, if $b \in \overline{F_v}[r]$, then for all $\tau \geq r$,

- $b \in \overline{F_v}[\tau]$, and
- for all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[\tau + 1]$, $(*, b, \tau) \notin \text{Verified}_i^c[\tau + 1]$.

Proof: Recall that $F_v[r] \subseteq F$, and $\overline{F_v}[r] = F - F_v[r]$.

For $r \geq 0$, consider a faulty node $b \in \overline{F_v}[r]$. Thus, $b \in F$.

We first prove that $b \in \overline{F_v}[\tau]$, for $\tau \geq r$. This is trivially true for $\tau = r$. So we only need to prove this for $\tau > r$. The proof is by contradiction.

Suppose that there exists $\tau > r$ such that $b \notin \overline{F_v}[\tau]$. Thus, $b \in F_v[\tau]$. The definition of $F_v[\tau]$ implies that node b 's round τ execution is verified by some fault-free node j . Then Claim 6 implies that node b 's round r execution is verified by node j . Hence by the definition of $F_v[r]$, $b \in F_v[r]$. This is a contradiction. This proves that $b \in \overline{F_v}[\tau]$.

Now, since $b \in \overline{F_v}[\tau]$, by Claim 7, for all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[\tau + 1]$, $(*, b, \tau) \notin \text{Verified}_i^c[\tau + 1]$. □

I Claims 8, 9 and 10

Claim 8 For $t \geq -1$, a fault-free node i adds at most one message from node j to $\text{Verified}_i[t]$, even if j is faulty.

Proof: As stated in the properties of the communication primitives in Section 2, each fault-free node i will reliably receive at most one message of the form $(*, j, t)$ from node j (either via **SVRecv** or via **RBRecv**). Since $\text{Verified}_i[t]$ only contains tuples corresponding to reliably received messages, the claim follows. □

Claim 9 For $t \geq 1$, consider nodes $i, j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$. If $(h, k, t) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t]$ and $(h', k, t) \in \text{Verified}_j^c[t]$, then $h = h'$.

Proof: We consider four cases:

- $i, j \in V - F$: In this case, due to *Global Uniqueness* property of the primitive, nodes i and j cannot reliably receive different round t messages from the same node. Hence the claim follows.
- $i \in V - F$ and $j \in F_v[t]$: Suppose that fault-free node p verifies round t execution of node j . Then by Claim 5(ii), eventually $\text{Verified}_j^c[t] \subseteq \text{Verified}_p[t]$. Since nodes i and p are both fault-free, similar to the previous case, due to the *Global Uniqueness* property, nodes i and p cannot reliably receive distinct round t messages. Thus, if $(h, k, t) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t]$ and $(h', k, t) \in \text{Verified}_j^c[t] \subseteq \text{Verified}_p[t]$, then $h = h'$.
- $j \in V - F$ and $i \in F_v[t]$: This case is similar to the previous case.
- $i, j \in F_v[t]$: In this case, there exist fault-free nodes k_i and k_j that verify round t execution of nodes i and j , respectively. Thus, by Claim 5(ii), eventually $(h, i, t) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t] \subseteq \text{Verified}_{k_i}[t]$ and $(h', i, t) \in \text{Verified}_j^c[t] \subseteq \text{Verified}_{k_j}[t]$. Since k_i, k_j are fault-free, *Global Uniqueness* implies that $h = h'$. □

Claim 10 For $t \geq 1$, consider nodes $i, j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$. There exists a fault-free node $g \in V - F$ such that $(h_g[t - 1], g, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t] \cap \text{Verified}_j^c[t]$.

Proof: For any fault-free node, say p , due to the conditions checked in Procedure **Proceed**, $|\text{Verified}_p^c[t]| \geq n - f$. For a node $k \in F_v[t]$, recall that $h_k[t]$ and $\text{Verified}_k^c[t]$ are defined in (2)

and (3). Thus, by Definition 5, there exists some fault-free node, say q , that reliably receives message $((h_k[t], \text{Verified}_k^c[t]), k, t + 1)$ from node k in round $t + 1$, and after performing checks in Procedure **Verify**, adds $(h_k[t], k, t)$ to $\text{Verified}_q^c[t + 1]$. The checks in Procedure **Verify**, performed by fault-free node q , ensure that $|\text{Verified}_k^c[t]| \geq n - f$.

Above argument implies that for the nodes $i, j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$, $\text{Verified}_i^c[t]$ and $\text{Verified}_j^c[t]$ both contain at least $n - f$ messages. Therefore, by Claims 8 and 9, there will be at least $n - 2f \geq df + 1 \geq f + 1$ elements in $\text{Verified}_i^c[t] \cap \text{Verified}_j^c[t]$. Since f is the upper bound on the number of faulty nodes, at least one element in $\text{Verified}_i^c[t] \cap \text{Verified}_j^c[t]$ corresponds to a fault-free node, say node $g \in V - F$. That is, there exists $g \in V - F$ such that $(h_g[t - 1], g, t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t] \cap \text{Verified}_j^c[t]$. \square

J Proof of Lemma 4

Lemma 4: For $t \geq 1$, transition matrix $\mathbf{M}[t]$ constructed using the above procedure satisfies the following conditions.

- For $i, j \in V$, there exists a fault-free node $g(i, j)$ such that $\mathbf{M}_{ig(i,j)}[t] \geq \frac{1}{n}$.
- $\mathbf{M}[t]$ is a row stochastic matrix, and $\lambda(\mathbf{M}[t]) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n}$.

Proof:

- To prove the first claim in the lemma, we consider four cases for node pairs i, j .
 - $i, j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$: By Claim 10, there exists a node $g(i, j)$ such that $(h_{g(i,j)}[t - 1], g(i, j), t - 1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[t] \cap \text{Verified}_j^c[t]$. By (9) in the procedure to construct $\mathbf{M}[t]$, $\mathbf{M}_{ig(i,j)}[t] = \frac{1}{|\text{Verified}_i^c[t]|} \geq \frac{1}{n}$ and $\mathbf{M}_{jg(i,j)}[t] = \frac{1}{|\text{Verified}_j^c[t]|} \geq \frac{1}{n}$.
 - $i \in \overline{F_v}[t]$ and $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$: $|\text{Verified}_j^c[t]| \geq n - f$ elements of $\mathbf{M}_j[t]$ are equal to $\frac{1}{|\text{Verified}_j^c[t]|} \geq \frac{1}{n}$. Since $n - f \geq (d + 1)f + 1 \geq 2f + 1$, there exists a fault-free node $g(i, j)$ such that $\mathbf{M}_{jg(i,j)} \geq \frac{1}{n}$. By (11), all elements of $\mathbf{M}_i[t]$, including $\mathbf{M}_{ig(i,j)}[t] = \frac{1}{n}$.
 - $j \in \overline{F_v}[t]$ and $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$: Similar to case (ii).
 - $i, j \in \overline{F_v}[t]$: By (11) in the procedure to construct $\mathbf{M}[t]$, all n elements in $\mathbf{M}_i[t]$ and $\mathbf{M}_j[t]$ both equal $\frac{1}{n}$. Choose a fault-free node as node $g(i, j)$. Then $\mathbf{M}_{ig(i,j)}[t] = \mathbf{M}_{ig(i,j)}[t] = \frac{1}{n}$.
- Observe that, by construction, for each $i \in V$, the row vector $\mathbf{M}_i[t]$ is stochastic. Thus, $\mathbf{M}[t]$ is row stochastic. Also, due to the claim proved in the previous item, and Claim 2, $\lambda(\mathbf{M}[t]) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n} < 1$. \square

K Proof of Lemma 5

Lemma 5: $h_i[0]$ for each node $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$ is valid.

Proof: Recall that $V - \overline{F_v}[0] = (V - F) \cup F_v[0]$. Now, consider two cases:

- $i \in V - F$: Recall that $h_i[0]$ is obtained using function $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$. Note that the function $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$ first computes frequency counts $N(x, k)$ for each (x, k) , and then computes sets Y and X using $N(x, k)$ values.

For X and Y computed in $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$, consider a value $x^* \in X$. Since $x^* \in X$, there must exist k^* such that $(x^*, k^*) \in Y$. This, in turn, implies that there must exist at least $f + 1$ tuples of the form $(\mathcal{I}, j, -1) \in \text{Verified}_i^c[0]$ such that $(x^*, k^*, -1) \in \mathcal{I}$. When j is a fault-free node, \mathcal{I} above must be equal to $\text{Verified}_j^c[-1]$ due to the algorithm specification. Since $(x^*, k^*, -1)$ appears in at least $f + 1$ tuples as observed above, there exists at least one fault-free node j such that $(x^*, k^*, -1) \in \text{Verified}_j^c[-1]$. Therefore, if k^* is fault-free, then x^* must be the input vector at node k^* .

Also, by Claim 8, for any faulty node b , at most one tuple of the form (b, v) may appear in set Y above. Therefore, except for at most f values in X (which may correspond to faulty nodes), all the other values in X must be equal to inputs at fault-free nodes. Therefore, at least one set C used to compute **temp** in step 4 in Case $t = 0$ of function $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$ must contain only the inputs at fault-free nodes. Therefore, $h_i[0] = \text{temp}$ is in the convex hull of the inputs at fault-free nodes. That is, $h_i[0]$ is valid.

- $i \in F_v[0]$: Suppose that round 0 execution of node i is verified by a fault-free node j . By Claim 5 in Appendix E, $h_i[0] = H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$, $|\text{Verified}_i^c[0]| \geq n - f$, and eventually $\text{Verified}_i^c[0] \subseteq \text{Verified}_j[0]$. Suppose that at some time τ , $\text{Verified}_i^c[0] \subseteq \text{Verified}_j[0]$. Let $\text{Verified}_j[0]$ at real time τ be denoted as $\text{Verified}_j^\tau[0]$. Then, $\text{Verified}_i^c[0] \subseteq \text{Verified}_j^\tau[0]$. By an argument similar to the previous item, it should be easy to see that $H(\text{Verified}_j^\tau[0], 0)$ is *valid*. Also, observe that if $\mathcal{V}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{V}_2$, then $H(\mathcal{V}_1, 0) \subseteq H(\mathcal{V}_2, 0)$. Thus, $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0) \subseteq H(\text{Verified}_j^\tau[0], 0)$, and since $H(\text{Verified}_j^\tau[0], 0)$ is valid, $H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$ is also valid. Thus, $h_i[0] = H(\text{Verified}_i^c[0], 0)$ is valid.

□

L Proof of Lemma 6

The proof is straightforward, but included here for completeness.

Lemma 6: *Suppose non-empty convex polytopes h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k are all valid. Consider k constants c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k such that $0 \leq c_i \leq 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^k c_i = 1$. Then the linear combination of these convex polytopes, $H_l(h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k; c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k)$, is valid.*

Proof:

Observe that the points in $H_l(h_1, \dots, h_k; c_1, \dots, c_k)$ are convex combinations of the points in h_1, \dots, h_k , because $\sum_{i=1}^k c_i = 1$ and $0 \leq c_i \leq 1$, for $1 \leq i \leq k$. Let G be the set of input vectors at the fault-free nodes in $V - F$. Then, $\mathcal{H}(G)$ is the convex hull of the inputs at the fault-free nodes. Since h_i , $1 \leq i \leq k$, is valid, each point $p \in h_i$ is in $\mathcal{H}(G)$. Since $\mathcal{H}(G)$ is a convex polytope, it follows that any convex combination of the points in h_1, \dots, h_k is also in $\mathcal{H}(G)$.

□

M Algebraic Manipulation in the Proof of Theorem 2

$$\begin{aligned}
d(p_i^*, p_j^*) &= \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d (p_i^*(l) - p_j^*(l))^2} \\
&= \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{ik}^* p_k(l) - \sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \mathbf{M}_{jk}^* p_k(l) \right)^2} \quad \text{by (16) and (17)} \\
&= \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} (\mathbf{M}_{ik}^* - \mathbf{M}_{jk}^*) p_k(l) \right)^2} \\
&\leq \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d \left[\alpha^{2t} \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \|p_k(l)\| \right)^2 \right]} \quad \text{by (15)} \\
&= \alpha^t \sqrt{\sum_{l=1}^d \left(\sum_{k \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]} \|p_k(l)\| \right)^2} \tag{27}
\end{aligned}$$

N Proof of Lemma 7

We first prove a claim that will be used in the proof of Lemma 7.

Claim 11 For $t \geq 1$, define $\mathbf{M}'[t] = \Pi_{\tau=1}^t \mathbf{M}[\tau]$. Then, for all nodes $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$, and $k \in \overline{F_v}[0]$, $\mathbf{M}'_{jk}[t] = 0$.

Proof: The proof is by induction on t .

Induction Basis: Consider the case when $t = 1$. Recall that $V - \overline{F_v}[1] = (V - F) \cup F_v[1]$. Consider any $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[1]$, and $k \in \overline{F_v}[0]$. Then by Lemma 3, $(*, k, 0) \notin \text{Verified}_j^c[1]$. Then, due to (10), $\mathbf{M}_{jk}[1] = 0$, and hence $\mathbf{M}'_{jk}[1] = \mathbf{M}_{jk}[1] = 0$.

Induction: Consider $t \geq 2$. Assume that the claim holds true through $t-1$. Then, $\mathbf{M}'_{jk}[t-1] = 0$ for all $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t-1]$ and $k \in \overline{F_v}[0]$. Recall that $\mathbf{M}'[t-1] = \Pi_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \mathbf{M}[\tau]$.

Now, we will prove that the claim holds true for t . Consider $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$ and $k \in \overline{F_v}[0]$. Note that $\mathbf{M}'[t] = \Pi_{\tau=1}^t \mathbf{M}[\tau] = \mathbf{M}[t] \Pi_{\tau=1}^{t-1} \mathbf{M}[\tau] = \mathbf{M}[t] \mathbf{M}'[t-1]$. Thus, $\mathbf{M}'_{jk}[t]$ can be non-zero only if there exists a $q \in V$ such that $\mathbf{M}_{jq}[t]$ and $\mathbf{M}'_{qk}[t-1]$ are both non-zero.

For any $q \in \overline{F_v}[t-1]$, by Lemma (3), $(*, q, t-1) \notin \text{Verified}_j^c[t]$. Then, due to (10), $\mathbf{M}_{jq}[t] = 0$ for all $q \in \overline{F_v}[t-1]$. Additionally, by the induction hypothesis, for all $q \in V - \overline{F_v}[t-1]$ and $k \in \overline{F_v}[0]$, $\mathbf{M}'_{qk}[t-1] = 0$. Thus, these two observations together imply that there does not exist any $q \in V$ such that $\mathbf{M}_{jq}[t]$ and $\mathbf{M}'_{qk}[t-1]$ are both non-zero. Hence, $\mathbf{M}'_{jk}[t] = 0$. \square

Lemma 7: For all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[t]$ and $t \geq 0$, $I_Z \subseteq h_i[t]$.

Proof: Recall that Z and I_Z are defined in (20) and (21), respectively. We first prove that for all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$, $I_Z \subseteq h_i[0]$.

Recall that $V - \overline{F_v}[0] = (V - F) \cup F_v[0]$. Now, consider two cases:

- $i \in V - F$:

We first make the following observations for each fault-free node i :

- *Observation 1:* $Verified_i^c[0]$ contains at least $f + 1$ messages from fault-free nodes (at line 14). This is due to the *Fault-free Integrity* property of the primitive, and the fact that $|Verified_i^c[0]| \geq n - f$ (due to the condition checked in procedure `Proceed` before $Verified_i^c[0]$ is set equal to $Verified_i[0]$).
- *Observation 2:* $Verified_i^c[0]$ contains tuples of the form $(\mathcal{V}, *, -1)$. We will say that a tuple $(\mathcal{V}, *, -1) \in Verified_i^c[0]$ contains Z if $Z \subseteq \mathcal{V}$. Due to Observation 1, at least $f + 1$ tuples in $Verified_i^c[0]$ contain Z , because tuples corresponding to all the fault-free nodes contain Z .
- *Observation 3:* Observation 2 and the definition of H imply that multiset X defined in step 3 of Case $t = 0$ of function H contains X_Z defined in Section 5.
- *Observation 4:* Let A and B be sets of points in the d -dimensional space, where $|A| \geq n - f$, $|B| \geq n - f$ and $A \subseteq B$. Define $h_A := \bigcap_{C_A \subseteq A, |C_A|=|A|-f} \mathcal{H}(C_A)$ and $h_B := \bigcap_{C_B \subseteq B, |C_B|=|B|-f} \mathcal{H}(C_B)$. Then $h_A \subseteq h_B$. This observation follows directly from the fact that every multiset C_A in the computation of h_A is contained in some multiset C_B used in the computation of h_B , and the property of \mathcal{H} .

Now, consider the computation of $h_i[0]$ at line 13. By Observation 3 and Observation 4, $I_Z \subseteq H(Verified_i^c[0], 0) = h_i[0]$.

- $i \in F_v[0]$:

Suppose that round 0 execution of node i is verified by a fault-free node j . By Claim 5, eventually $Verified_i^c[0] \subseteq Verified_j[0]$. Since node j is fault-free, $Verified_j[0]$, and therefore, $Verified_i^c[0]$, contains messages from at most f faulty nodes. This together with the fact that $|Verified_i^c[0]| \geq n - f$ (by Claim 5), implies that $Verified_i^c[0]$ contains messages from at least $f + 1$ fault-free nodes. Then by this observation and the fact that $h_i[0] = H(Verified_i^c[0], 0)$ (by Claim 5), we can show that $I_Z \subseteq h_i[0]$ using the same argument as in the previous case.

Thus, $I_Z \in h_i[0]$ for all $i \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$.

Now we make several observations for each fault-free node $i \in V - F$:

- As shown above, $I_Z \in h_j[0]$ for all $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$.

- From (13), for $t \geq 1$,

$$\mathbf{v}[t] = \mathbf{M}^* \mathbf{v}[0]$$

where $\mathbf{v}_j[0] = h_j[0]$ for $j \in V - \overline{F_v}[0]$.

- By Theorem 1, $\mathbf{v}_i[t] = h_i[t]$.

- Observe that \mathbf{M}^* equals $\mathbf{M}'[t]$ defined in Claim 11. Thus, due to Claim 11, $\mathbf{M}_{ik}^* = 0$ for $k \in \overline{F_v}[0]$ (i.e., $k \notin V - \overline{F_v}[0]$).

- \mathbf{M}^* is the product of row stochastic matrices; therefore, \mathbf{M}^* itself is also row stochastic. Thus, for fault-free node i , $\mathbf{v}_i[t] = h_i[t]$ is obtained as the product of the i -th row of \mathbf{M}^* , namely \mathbf{M}_i^* , and $\mathbf{v}[0]$: this product yields a linear combination of the elements of $\mathbf{v}[0]$, where the weights are non-negative and add to 1 (because \mathbf{M}_i^* is a stochastic row vector).
- From (7), recall that $\mathbf{M}_i^* \mathbf{v}[0] = H_i(\mathbf{v}[0]^T ; \mathbf{M}_i^*)$. Function H_i ignores the input polytopes for which the corresponding weight is 0. Finally, from the previous observations, we have that when the weight in $\mathbf{M}^*[i]$ is non-zero, the corresponding polytope in $\mathbf{v}[0]^T$ contains I_Z . Therefore, the linear combination also contains I_Z .

Thus, I_Z is contained in $h_i[t] = \mathbf{v}_i[t] = \mathbf{M}_i^* \mathbf{v}[0]$. □

O Proof of Theorem 3

Theorem 3: *The output convex polytope at fault-free node i using Optimal Verified Averaging is optimal as per Definition 2.*

Proof: Consider set X_Z defined in Section 5. Due to Claim 8 in Appendix E and the fact that set X_Z contains at least $(n - f)$ tuples, at least $(n - 2f)$ tuples in X_Z correspond to inputs at fault-free nodes. Let V_Z denote the set of fault-free nodes whose tuples appears in X_Z . Let $S = V - F - V_Z$. Since $|X_Z| \geq n - f$, $|S| \leq f$.

Now consider the following execution of any algorithm ALGO that correctly solves Byzantine convex consensus. Suppose that the faulty nodes in F follow the algorithm correctly except choosing an incorrect input (in acceptable range for inputs). Consider the case when nodes in $V - V_Z$, including fault-free nodes in S , are so slow that the other fault-free nodes must terminate before receiving any messages from the nodes in $V - V_Z$. The fault-free nodes in V_Z cannot determine whether the nodes in $V - V_Z$ are just slow, or faulty (crashed).

Nodes in V_Z must be able to terminate without receiving any messages from the nodes in $V - V_Z$, including fault-free nodes in S . Thus, the output must be in the convex hull of inputs at the fault-free nodes whose tuples are included in X_Z . However, any f of the nodes whose values are in X_Z may be faulty. Therefore, the output obtained by ALGO must be contained in I_Z as defined in Section 5. On the other hand, by Lemma 7, the output obtained using *Optimal Verified Averaging* contains I_Z . This proves the theorem. □